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I
      The starting point of our discussion is the fact, so very often emphasized, 
that Japan was the first non-Western society to become fully modernized and in-
dustrialized. This fact constitutes from a comparative point of view a very in-
teresting and challenging paradox or series of paradoxes. 
      One of these central paradoxes is that while in Japan there has developed 
the first and at least till recently the only fully successful non-Western moderniza-
tion, this modernization has been that of a non-Axial civilization - a civilization 
which would not be seen, in Weber's term, as a Great Religion or World Religion. 
     Weber's analysis of the civilizational roots of capitalism was part of his 
comparative sociology of religion. This comparative analysis was based on the 
premise that in all the Great Religions which he studied there existed the structu-
ral and cultural potentialities for the development of capitalism - but that it was 
only in the West that these potentialities bore fruit. In other Great Religions or 
Civilizations - in what later on would be called Axial civilizations - these 
potentialities were obviated by the specific hegemonic combination of structural 
and cultural components that developed within them - very central among them 
being the confrontations between orthodoxies and heterodoxies or sectarianism. 
Truly enough Weber dealt only with the emergence of the original, first capital-
ism - not with its expansion, and yet even in this framework the paradox of 
Japan, a non-Axial civilization that has become the first fully modernized non-
Western society, stands out. 
     But the crux of this paradox lies not only in the fact that Japan was the 
first non-Axial civilization to modernize. It was the only such civilization. All 
the other Great Non-Axial Civilizations - which in contrast to Japan were also 
pre-Axial civilizations - not only did not become modern or industrial ones. 
They were, in different ways, swamped over as it were, incorporated into diffe-
rent Axial civilizations losing their distinctive civilizational distinctiveness - even 
if often maintaining some components of their identity. Japan not only was not 
incorporated into the different Axial civilizations which impinged on it - the
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Sino-Confucian and the Buddhist ones - but has been able to develop a very 
distinct continuous pattern of institutional and cultural dynamics . 
     Among the distinct characteristics of this pattern, two are of special in-
terest from the point of view of our analysis. The first is the very high tempo of 
institutional change, in many ways reminiscent of those that developed in West-
ern Europe - namely the transition from a tribal monarchy pretending to be 
an Empire; to feudalism and then to a relatively centralized absolutism; up to the 
revolutionary breakthrough to modernity, with rather distinct modes of struc-
turation and cultural definition of these changes - namely from the continual 
reformulation of such activities in contextual settings or templates defined in 
some combination of primordial, social and natural terms. Such similarities 
could be identified also with respect to the direct background to modernization in 
the Tokugawa period - namely the development of structural pluralism, of a 
multiplicity of centers, of economic power, the breakdown of narrow segregated 
ecological frameworks, the opening up of family structure, especially indeed in 
the rural sector, which generated many new resources, and more than incipient, 
very wide, cross-domain marketization. All these were in many ways very simi-
lar to those which industrialization in Europe was attributed to, as were also the 
high levels of literacy and urbanization, and extensive economic integration have 
been the most important. 
     But here we encounter the second major feature of the distinctive pattern 
of cultural and institutional dynamics that developed in Japan, which constitutes 
another central comparative paradox - namely that despite these structural simi-
larities, between Western Europe and Japan, throughout their respective histories 
- ecnomic , political, or cultural - and dynamics, including the modes that have 
developed in Japan, have been patterns of institutional formations markedly diffe-
rent from the Western one. They pertain to the very basic ways in which the va-
rious institutional arenas are regulated, defined - namely in line with some com-
bination of primordial, sacral and natural terms. 
     The major characteristics of this definition have been the strong emphasis 
on contextual frameworks and the concomitant relative weakness of fully formal-
ized, abstract rules demarcating clearly between the different arenas of action, and 
defining them in abstract formal terms as separate entities. Any institutional are-
na - political, economic, family and cultural creativity, or individual, group or 
organizations - has been defined in terms of its relation to the social nexus in 
which it was embedded. Such nexus was defined in some - continuously 
changing - combination of primordial, sacral, natural and ascriptive terms. The 
distinctive characteristic of these terms was that they were not defined in relation 
to some principles transcending them.
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     Thus, social actors, individuals or institutional arenas have been defined in 
their relation to other such actors not as autonomous ontological entities, but in 
terms of their mutual interweaving in common frameworks or contexts. Con-
comitantly, the major arenas of social action have not been regulated above all by 
distinct autonomous, legal, bureaucratic or "voluntary" organizations or rules -
even if such organizations have developed within them - but mostly through 
various less formal arrangements and networks which have in their turn usually 
been embedded in various ascriptively defined, and continuously redefined, social 
contexts. 
     Concomitantly there developed in Japan a strong tendency to the confla-
tion of different occupational or class sectors within the different social contexts 
- be they enterprises , neighborhoods or such frameworks as various new reli-
gions - above all within the context of the overall national community. Con-
comitantly, in Japan the major elites and influentials were embedded in broader 
settings or contexts, defined in some combination of primordial, sacral, and natu-
ral terms in which symbols of kinship were often predominant. 
     This distinct mode of structuration has been most clearly evident in the 
double-pronged nature of the impact of movements of protest and processes of 
change, and of foreign influences on the dynamics of Japanese society. 
      Such processes have generated new modes of discourse and given rise to 
many "segregated" sectors of action as well as to a growing reflexivity, in which 
new types of cultural and social activities have flourished, and the awareness of 
many alternative cultural and social possibilities has been heightened. The various 
themes promulgated by such movements and by public responses to them and 
often under the impingement of outside forces, have been in many cases incorpo-
rated in the public discourse; new, more sophisticated discourses have developed, 
and many concrete demands have been acceded to. Above all, new social spaces 
have often been created in which many new patterns of economic and social 
activities, modes of cultural creativity and patterns of discourse could develop. 
      On the other hand, the continuous reformulation of the basic ontological 
conceptions and conceptions of social order prevalent in most sectors of Japanese 
society has been guided by and reformulated, as pointed out above, in contextual 
settings or templates defined in some combination of primordial, social and natu-
ral terms, and the new themes and orientations have not been, as it were, able to 
break through the relative hegemony of these themes. 
     It is these distinct features that characterize Japan as a highly dynamic non-
Axial civilization. How can the "origins" and the continual reproduction of these 
characteristics be explained? Let's start first with the analysis of the historical 
"origins" of these constitutional and cultural patterns . 
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                      II 
     The most plausible attempt to analyze the historical roots of the specific 
Japanese institutional formations and dynamics has been the one systematically 
presented by Johann P. Arnason, building on the earlier expositions and insights 
of Asakawa and George Sansom. The focal point of this analysis follows Max 
Weber in his analysis of the modes of disintegration of early clan-society. "... In 
the case of Japan the focal historical points are the Taika reform at the end of the 
7th century" which attempted to create the first "Imperial" clan state in Japan and 
which ultimately resulted, as Asakawa underlines: "in the practical isolation, one 
from the other, of the two principles constituting the reform. The organization 
of Japan prior to 645 was a fictitious hierarchy, whose foundation, the clan or 
quasi-clan, was now theoretically destroyed, while the apex, the Emperor, was 
preserved and elevated... The loss was compensated by the imported conception 
of the state. How could the two be reconciled with each other? ... Combined 
with causes too deep and numerous to be even casually referred to here, the two 
fundamentally incongruous factors, the Emperor and the state, were gradually 
pulled apart from one another, until the authority of the former was completely 
usurped by the high civil officers who surrounded his person and the majority of 
whom issued from one and the same family, and the state lapsed into the real 
control of certain new military clans. " 
     This bifurcation resulted in the crystallization of a specific mode of double 
parallel hegemony, that of power and authority, which contrasted greatly with 
the seemingly parallel development in Europe. 
     "The imperial court appropriated the cultural and symbolic hegemony, 
which was almost never challenged - and which seemingly could not have been 
effectively challenged. Indeed, it constituted the institution epitomizing the col-
lective identity and consciousness, the encounter with the other - especially with 
China. At the same time political and economic power were continually vested 
in the various types of aristocratic or feudal groups. These however lacked any 
autonomous legitimation distinct from the imperial one. Hence, unlike for inst-
ance the Church in Europe, there did not develop any centers or bases of power 
which were autonomous from the feudal nexus and from the imperial center -
nor did the cultural and the power and economic centers compete with each 
other for both power and legitimation. " 1
1 J. P. Arnason, "Comparing Japan and the West: Prolegomena to a Research Programme", in L. Gule 
  and 0. Storebo, eds., Development and Modernity: Perspectives on Western Theories of Moderniza-
  tion, Bergen, Ariadne, 1993, pp. 167-95, citing K. Asakawa, The Early Institutional Life of Japan. A 
  Study in the Reform of 645 A.D., New York, Paragon, 1963. 
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     "It was also in this period that the specific bifurcation between power and 
anthority that was at the root of the specific pattern of state formation that de-
veloped in Japan, crystallised; it was also in the framework of this formation that 
the strong tendency to status dissociation developed in many sectors of Japanese 
society. "
III
     This type of institutional development attendant on the disintegration of a 
clan-society is distinct both from the one that characterized the development of 
great pre-Axial patrimonial empires (like the ancient Egyptian ones) and from the 
various Axial civilizations. In such empires the transition from one stage of poli-
tical development to another (e.g., from early state to archaic kingdom) has 
usually been connected with the reconstruction and widening of the kinship 
and/or territorial elements and ascriptive categories and symbols, with the grow-
ing importance of territorial units as opposed to purely kinship ones, and with 
what may be called the qualitative extension and diversification of basic cosmolo-
gical conceptions. It was also characterized by the increasing specialization of the 
elites (who were, however, on the whole, embedded in various - and even very 
complex and wide-ranging - ascriptive units), by a close correspondence be-
tween structural differentiation and the differentiation of elite functions, and by 
the prevalence of cultural models and conceptions containing relatively low levels 
of tension between the transcendental and mundane orders. The centers that de-
veloped in such societies were ecologically and organizationally, but not symboli-
cally, distinct from the periphery. 
     In contrast, the Axial Age civilizations were marked by growing distinc-
tions, even discrepancies, between the structural differentiation of the social divi-
sion of labor and the differentiation of elite functions. In addition, these societies 
witnessed the emergence of autonomous elites and concomitantly more radical 
developments or breakthroughs in cultural orientations, especially in the direction 
of the radical conception of the tension between the mundane and the transcen-
dental orders. At the same time, different modes of institutional formations 
appeared including distinct, civilizational, or religious collectivities; different 
types of autonomous centers distinct from their peripheries. At the same time 
there developed in these civilizations a strong, tendency to ideological politics. 
     The distinctiveness of the institutional development in Japan was of an un-
usual combination of a very high level of structural differentiation together with 
a low level of distinction between roles and of autonomy of elite functions, that 
is, with the fact that in Japan the major elite functions were embedded in ascrip-
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tive settings, and did not develop as culturally and socially autonomous units. 
     The major context in which the development of potentially highly special-
ized but not autonomous elites took place was indeed the differentiation in Japan 
of a clan-society into two distinct, non-competing centers - between the Emper-
or and the State, of power and of authority. In its turn the absence or weakness 
of such elites reinforced the continuity of these two non-competing centers and 
the bifurcation between power and authority. This mode of differentiation was 
also reinforced by the changes in the structure of family and kinship, connected 
with the shift from the "uji" (clan) to the "ie" system, which led among others 
to a growing tendency to primogeniture which took place around the Kamakura 
period.
                       IV 
     The most important aspects of the Japanese family and kinship system 
from the point of view of our discussion - frameworks within which the speci-
fic patterns of behavior and institutional formations which have been prevalent in 
large sectors of Japanese society did crystallize and could be reproduced - i . e. 
from the point of view of their development have been, as first analyzed by Ma-
rion Levy and John Pelzel, and later on by Francis K. Hsu, and most recently by 
Jane Bachnik and were reaffirmed in many other researches. These are: a) the 
combination, at least from the time of the medieval Middle Ages, of fairly open 
unigeniture; the relatively wide practice - prevalent even if in changing form up 
till today - of adoption and of incorporation of people from outside the family 
into it, a practice continuing in very interesting ways up to the contemporary 
scene; b) the strong emphasis on functional adequacy and achievement perform-
ance, within the framework of family solidarity; c) the relatively strong emph-
asis, even if with many variations across regions, and at least from the medieval 
period, on the nuclear unit - the one which would in the Edo and Meiji periods 
become crystallized in the formalized "ie" system; d) the weakness of broader 
kinship units as manifest in the absence or vagueness of specific broader kinship 
terminology as against such general connotations as "uncle" or "cousin"; and the 
consequent lack of specification of obligations to such wider kin categories -
very similar, as R. Smith has pointed out, to the English and American cases. 
Of crucial importance is that the le, "the basic family unit," as it probably de-
veloped from the Middle Ages, has been conceived, not "as a kinship unit 
based on ties of descent, but as a corporate group that holds property , land, a 
reputation, works of art, or "cultural capital" in perpetuity. Ie are perhaps best 
understood as corporate groups which can serve a primary religious function , to 
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provide social welfare and the like. Pelzel succinctly describes the ie as "task 
performance". The fact that throughout most of Japanese history rights (espe-
cially, but not only, in land) were vested in the family was of course of crucial 
importance. 
     It is important however to emphasize that one has to distinguish here be-
tween on the one hand the more formalized "ie" structure which was instituted 
or institutionalized probably only in the Edo period and made the cornerstone of 
the Meiji legal family system; and which certainly was not also the only type of 
family organization in earlier times, and on the other hand the more analytical 
orientations which guided the construction of family relations, cutting across 
several types of family organisation. 
      The concrete forms of family varied greatly even in the Edo period - and 
certainly earlier - between regions and classes. Indeed, in several regions the 
older clan-like organization continued to be prevalent through the middle ages -
as was the case also in several sectors of the lower strata. It seems however that 
many of the more general principles and orientations analyzed above have been 
of wider importance in structuring family relations in many sectors of Japanese 
society. One of the most important outcomes of all these characteristics of the ie 
has been the relatively high degree of availability of free resources within the 
family; the relative ease with which such resources have been mobilized within 
the family and used in directions which seemed appropriate to its leaders - and 
have often been redirected into other non-kinship groups which were yet orga-
nized to principles which have regulated the family structure. It is these features 
of the Japanese social structure which make up the "yemoto system", a term de-
noting, according to Francis X. Hsu, kinship-like groups or a group or setting 
which, according to him, constitutes the basic core of Japanese social structure. 
     As Jane Bachnik has recently (private communication) put it, especially 
with respect to the contemporary scene, "The ie itself can be viewed as a contex-
tualized locus with permeable boundaries that is closely connected by a network 
of ties beyond itself (which are part of its organization). These ties are the focus 
of the organization for the members, and this kind of a focal organization con-
nected with its ties is actually the model for the large industrial groupings of the 
keiretsu and kigyo shudan (vertical and horizontal groupings)." 
     It is these basic characteristics of the family and kinship settings - above 
all perhaps indeed the widespread practice of adoption which entailed the total 
transformation of the adopted person into the household and ancestry of the 
adoptee -- that have limited the "self-closure" of particularistic family and kin 
groups, and made them open to permeation by "outside," more "central" forces, 
by the center or centers. But at the same time society and its center or centers 
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have been continually defined in kinship symbols and legitimized in "internal" 
terms, in terms of their own existence, and not in some terms beyond them. 
Hence the family and kinship units have been open to such permeation by almost 
any power which was ultimately legitimated by the "familistic" social order ulti-
mately symbolized by the figure or trope of the emperor, or of the collectivity. 
One manifestation of this openness, defined in terms of loyalty to any occupant 
of the respective center, is the specification in Japanese - as distinct from 
Chinese - neo-Confucianism of the primacy of the loyalty to one's lord as 
against one's father. 
      It was this combination of the openness of the family unit to outside 
forces and the fact that these forces were constructed in terms of wider kinship 
symbolism that explain the fact that the wider forces which impinged on the 
family and permeated it were themselves constructed and legitimated in terms of 
wider family and kinship symbolism. There developed the tendency, so strong 
in many sectors of Japanese society, to channel the very intensive changes that 
have taken place in different arenas, and the very strong achievement orientations 
connected with them, in the direction of the reconstruction of contexts defined 
in sacral, primordial or cultural terms and symbols, often in a kinship-like, 
"iemoto" structure. 
     This tendency to openness and predisposition to change together with the 
channelling of such change in the reconstruction of contexts defined in primordial 
natural or sacral terms has been reinforced in Japanese society by yet another cen-
tral aspect of Japanese social organization. This has been the relative - obvious-
ly only relative - looseness of the relations between power, wealth, and status 
within any given setting or context, above all the relatively flexible way in which 
the relations between authority, power and wealth have been structured. 
      It is the special mode of status incongruence which has also developed in 
Japanese society in the early period of the formative stage of state crystallization, 
of the bifurcation between the emperor and the military leader, later the shogun, 
between power and authority, that has probably been of crucial importance in 
generating the strong predisposition to change to be found in large sectors of 
Japanese society, and in shaping the process of change within that society. The 
flexibility built into this pattern when connected with the family and kinship 
structure have created very wide institutional "empty spaces," i. e. spaces the 
concrete contents of which are not predetermined, which can be filled in different 
directions. It has provided also very strong incentives and created many structu-
ral opportunities for change. The combination of such relative disassociation be-
tween status, power, authority and wealth, and of a relatively decentralized pat-
tern of political rule, has generated continuous processes of ecological, economic 
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and social mobility, and a wide range of possible combinations between them -
thus creating continuous possibilities of institutional innovation . But at the same 
time the channelling of such innovations has been guided by orientation to the 
prestige vested in the center, and such prestige has usually been defined in terms 
of the basic symbolism of the center with its strong primordial-sacral and collec-
tive national components, with a very strong kinship symbolism , most fully 
epitomized in the symbolism of the Emperor. 
      This centrality of the emperor figure can be seen for instance in the fact 
that the specific pattern of ancestor worship that has developed in Japan , especial-
ly in modern times, especially by the Meiji state, but building on earlier disposi-
tions, has promulgated the theme or idea that the imperial ancestor worship en-
compasses, to a very large extent, the ancestor worship of different households 
- very much in line with the basic characteristics of adoption in Japan . As the 
teachers manuals of history of 1920 stated: "Amaterasu Omikami is not only the 
ancestor of the Imperial House, but also of all Japanese. " 
      In this context, of crucial importance is the fact that the Emperor symbol-
ism entails, as R.N. Bellah and Shigeru Matsumoto2 have pointed out , a very 
strong maternal grounding of authority. To follow Bellah: 
          But of course the emphasis on the feminine side is not something 
recently discovered by social scientists. Who is the most important figure in 
Japanese mythology? Of course the sun-goddess, Amaterasu o mikami. Not 
only is she female but, unlike some more Amazonian types in other mythologies , 
her influence is exercised in a very feminine way. She is no patriarchal despot 
like Jehovah. She is often portrayed as confused; she relies on the advice of her 
counselors; she asks the will of higher gods through divination. She is often 
shown as relatively weak and defenseless, for example, as compared to the willful 
Susa no o no mikoto. She is a peacemaker, conciliator, mediator, not a despot. 
      "It is m
y contention that through Amaterasu we can understand the 
emperor in Japanese ideology, the very emperor who is the focus of the whole 
austere Confucian family-state unit." 
      " ... But not only was there a base in the family (the mother) which pro-
vided emotional security for breaking with all traditional identifications of status 
and occupation, there was also an external base, namely the emperor . All kinds 
of aggressive and innovative behavior could be legitimated if it were for the sake 
of the emperor..." 
      " ... The emperor, then, both in recent times and in the far distant past ,
2 S. Matsumoto, Motoori Norinaga, 1730-1801, Harvard East Asian Series , No.44, Cambridge Mass., 
  Harvard University Press, 1970.
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has been primarily an emotional point of reference. He stands for no policy, no 
rules, no institution and no constitution. The men who rule and who build 
institutions may come and go. The imperial house is unaffected. This pattern 
has had the function of providing what Maruyama has called an empty envelope 
or empty bag. Anything can go in - there is almost infinite receptiveness and 
flexibility - yet also a stable point of reference unrelated to the particular cultu-
ral content of the moment. The difficulty is that this pattern makes it extremely 
difficult to establish higher order universalistic cultural controls..." 3 
     It is this mode of grounding of authority that generates the combination of 
the openness of the family to outside, society-wide force which constitute the 
basis of extensions of trust beyond the family, with the couching of such exten-
sion in broader, generalized family and kinship terms and symbols, in a "iemoto" 
pattern, with very strong expressive components and not in terms of criteria 
beyond such kinship symbols. The crux of these processes is the generation of 
generalized particularistic trust.
V 
     It is indeed the continual construction and reconstruction of generalized 
particularistic trust that constitutes the crux of the specific dynamics that de-
veloped in Japanese society. 
      Such trust is a generalized trust, yet defined in broad particularistic terms, 
which is close to but not identical with R.N. Bellah's generalised particularism.4 
This trust is not confined to narrow settings. It is generalized through the con-
tinual extension between many different settings or situations, but such gener-
alization is not effected in universalistic terms, but rather through continually 
changing particularistic ones. 
      Such construction and reconstruction of generalized particularistic trust can 
be seen in the transitions from one setting to another, especially from the indul-
gent familial setting to the school, which do not, of crucial importance here, en-
tail a total rupture between the solidarity and trust generated within the family 
and the outside, "achievement oriented" society. Rather, such transitions entail a 
combination of the emphasis on achievement together with the extension of trust 
generated in the family to a broader solidarity setting in which symbols of family 
and community are strongly emphasized. Such extension of trust is also very 
3 R.N. Bellah, "The Japanese Emperor as a Mother Figure. Some Preliminary Notes", paper presented at 
  the Colloquium of the Center for Japanese Studies and Korean Studies, 11 October 1967. 
4 R.N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion. The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan, Glencoe III., The Free Press, 
  1957. 
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closely connected with the construction of new spaces and contexts, structured 
according to the axes of omote and ura, tatemae and honne, soto and uchi -
among them outlets for various forms of expressive behavior, ranging from the 
"small pleasures" of life to often inhibited sexual and aggressive drives, as well as 
very delicate aesthetic sensibilities. 
      Such reconstruction and broadening of the range of trust in terms of the 
extension of primordial, sacral and ascriptive - not transcendental - criteria, is 
closely connected with an emphasis on achievement set within expressive and 
solidary settings defined in these terms, and on the movement between the con-
texts of interaction defined in the dualistic terms of "tatemae and honne, " "uchi 
and soto" and "omote and ura. " Such reconstruction makes the extension of 
trust seem to flow naturally from one setting to another, from one context to 
another - seemingly unquestioned. Trust is here conceived as embedded in such 
settings, not as being conditional on adherence to some principles which are 
beyond these settings. It is, as we have already noted above, self-referential. 
This reconstruction of trust bears a very close similarity to the strong emphasis 
on finding transcendence in the rules of form - an emphasis which at the same 
time allows a very large scope for innovation in contents. 
      The result of the central importance of the continuous extension of trust 
from one solidary setting to another is, as Raymond Grew put it (personal com-
munication), "a universal expectation that the behavior of others will be predict-
able, which reinforces the emphasis upon social form and also what has often 
been described as a pressure for conformity and an anti-individualistic quality. 
You can only trust what you know and expect. Recognizing that, the Japanese 
tend to present innovations in terms of continuity, individual contributions as 
expressions of the group..."
                   VI 
     The potentiality for such extension of particularistic trust, for the continual 
reproduction of generalized particularistic trust, is given or generated in the 
various processes analyzed above with their historical roots in the specific pattern 
of the disintegration of the clan society; the confrontation between the two 
societies; the crystallization of the distinct characteristics of family structure and 
kin symbolism analyzed above. 
      But the continual construction and reconstruction of such generalized 
particularistic trust especially in complex, including of course modern, settings, is 
not automatically given or assured by the existence of these conditions. Indeed 
the very possibility of the reproduction of these conditions themselves and of the 
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continual reconstruction of generalized particularistic trust is contingent on the 
development and continuity of specific patterns of interaction between different 
social actors and sectors of the society, especially between different elite and sub-
elite groups and broader sectors of the society. 
     The special characteristics of such processes of interaction and exchange 
which tended to develop in large sectors of Japanese society lies in the nature of 
the resources in the modes in which the basic resources - power, trust, prestige, 
information and instrumental resources - are combined in these processes. The 
special characteristic of this combination is the prevalence, in most patterns of ex-
change or social interaction, in many sectors of Japanese society, of a certain type 
of package deals in which solidarity, power and instrumental resources are con-
tinuously interwoven and organized in relatively enduring contexts, oriented to 
long term interaction. Unlike in many other, especially modern, societies, these 
different types of resources are not organized in separate ad hoc discrete activities 
or within organizational frameworks which are then connected through such for-
mal frameworks as legal agencies, bureaucracies, or the impersonal market. 
     The major characteristic of these patterns of exchange which has been 
coined by Murakami and Rohlen, following Peter Blau's nomenclature, as "social 
exchange" is the continuous combination of various packages of resources under 
the canopy of long-range trust. Such packages of resources are channelled 
through the numerous chains of networks characteristic of Japanese society -
and through the continual transmission of information within them. 
     This mode of interaction or of exchange is closely related to the far-
reaching limitation on the tendencies to congruence between the different dimen-
sions of status, and the concomitant limitations of the degree to which the 
respective resources - wealth, power and status - can be converted into one 
another. 
     These patterns of interaction have been effected in the numerous closely 
interwoven, very dense networks which characterize Japanese society. It is these 
dense networks that contribute, as Michael Hechter put it, to the very high level 
of mutual visibility to which most Japanese are exposed in most arenas of their 
life - in school, family, work place, neighborhood or leisure time activities. It 
is this high level of visibility which is so closely related to the repressive aspect of 
the modes of regulation in Japanese life that constitutes the other side of the in-
teraction and trust relations analyzed above. 
     Many of these patterns of interaction can of course also be found in other 
societies - but not to the same extent as in Japan where they became hegemonic, 
in which they are prevalent in many arenas of social interaction in Japan, among 
them in the special pattern of patron-client relations. 
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                      VII 
      These patterns of interaction and exchange have been closely related with 
the modes of control exercised by the major elites and subelites in Japanese socie-
ty in their interaction with broader sectors of society. 
      One important component of such processes of control and regulation is 
the relatively (indeed only - and very - relatively) smaller scope of the coercion 
employed by the elites as compared to parallel situations in other societies. Coer-
cion has been employed by the elites in Japan, as in all other societies, in order to 
resolve conflicts in the direction most convenient to them. In the modern period 
in Japan, as in all modern societies, the ruling groups have employed various 
means of repression and suppression - and to this very day the Japanese police 
suffers from the negative image and reputation they have inherited in the post-
Meiji period. In most periods of Japanese history - even in those characterized 
by intensive strife and violent conflicts - the coercive measures employed by 
different elites have usually been closely interwoven with other modes of social 
control, with some distinct characteristics. 
      In Japan, these processes of repression have usually combined - albeit in 
different measures in different periods - with the tendency to leave some living 
space to the loser, or at least to some losers. Even if individual losers were ex-
ecuted, the groups with which they were connected were left some space, and 
were strongly interwoven with the less formal processes of control analyzed 
above. Even the most dramatic, conflictual changes in Japanese history , in which 
there was much bloodshed and many losers - leaders of rebellions of different 
faction like for instance Eto Shinpei, a Meiji leader who led a rebellion in 1874 
and was executed, did not give rise to "regimes of terror." 
     Closely related to this mode of repression and regulation have been the 
continuous restructuring, by various influentials, gate keepers and elites, of net-
works, markets and of status hierarchies, together with a certain mode of respon-
siveness to the demands made by different groups, and the cooptation of different 
echelons onto middle and sometimes even higher rungs of the vertical hierar-
chies. Such restructuring of networks and markets has often been the result of 
the many policies promulgated in different periods of Japanese history which we 
have analyzed above and to which we shall turn shortly again. Such restructur-
ing of networks and markets and of status hierarchies has been closely related to 
the dissociation between status and wealth (evident for instance in the lack of 
clear lines of promotion within departments of industries or firms). 
     One of the most important aspects of this process is the fact that the 
modes of regulation employed by the elites and influentials are basically very 
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similar to those prevalent within families. In other words it is not just the elites 
and influentials who constitute the major agency through which institutional 
formations are crystallized. Rather it is the continual interaction between them 
and the broader sectors that constitutes such agency. 
     The engagement in these patterns of interaction and of regulation does 
not mean, of course, that force, coercion and repression did not play an impor-
tant role in the reproduction and reconstruction of the basic features of the 
institutional formations in Japan. It does not mean that no competition or con-
flicts develop between different groups in Japanese society and that no coercion is 
used by the elites to regulate or quell conflicts. What our analysis implies is that 
it is only in so far as force, coercion and repression were interwoven with these 
premises of interaction - and such interweaving greatly influenced the modes of 
coercion - that they were able to renegotiate and reconstruct these institutional 
patterns. Or in other words our analysis implies that competitions and conflict 
are regulated in many situations in Japan in a distinct way. Even when confron-
tational situations develop out of such conflicts, it is the re-establishment of trust, 
of a certain level of predictability within the prevalent basic premises of interac-
tion - even if some of its terms are changed - that often constitutes a major 
objective of the contestants; and it is the ability to restructure the networks and 
trust under conditions of intensive change that constitutes the major challenge for 
the elites and influentials.
                     VIII 
      These patterns of interaction and control have been closely related to the 
basic characteristics of the major elites and influentials, and their major coalitions 
- and counter-coalitions - and the modes of reflexivity that seem to have been 
predominant in different - even if not all - sectors of Japanese society, at least 
from the Kamakura period. 
      Such coalitions have been composed of many and varying actors - and 
their exact composition has naturally varied from place to place and from period 
to period. The most important among these have been the "functional" elites -
political, military, economic, and cultural-religious - as well as representatives 
of the family, village, feudal or regional sectors, or in modern times different 
economic and bureaucratic actors. 
      Yet some common characteristics of these coalitions can be identified in 
most periods of Japanese history and most sectors of Japanese society. The most 
important characteristic of these elites, influentials, counter-elites and of their ma-
jor coalitions has been their embedment in groups and settings mainly defined in 
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primordial, ascriptive, sacral, natural and often hierarchical terms, rather than in 
terms of specialized functional or strong universalistic criteria of social attributes . 
At the same time such coalitions have evinced a great openness, a strong tenden-
cy to coopt new members and to extend their membership and arenas of activi-
ties. They have usually been constructed and effected through vertical rather 
than horizontal ties and loyalties through the very numerous networks, even if 
this fact has not necessarily negated the existence and consciousness of such hori-
zontal divisions within many sectors of Japanese society. Moreover these con-
crete coalitions have often been shifting, in the concrete composition of their 
membership, between different contexts. 
      At the same time, the members of different subgroups or networks within 
any such coalition have not been granted autonomous access to the centers of 
power within them, just as the members of different sectors of Japanese society 
have not generally possessed independent access to the centers of collectivities in 
which they have participated. The groups have themselves been supervised by 
their hierarchical superiors - a strong overlord, the shogun, and in rare cases by 
the emperor. 
     These characteristics of the major coalitions and counter-coalitions and the 
tendency to the extension of membership beyond the nuclear family are very 
close, even if not entirely identical, to those of the "iemoto" pattern analyzed by 
Francis X. Hsu, or to those of the "ie" society or organization, as defined by 
Murakami, Sato and Kumon or to the closely related contextual model analyzed 
by Hamaguchi and associates - the model of social organization they see as 
having been predominant in Japan from the early medieval period with the very 
strong emphasis on interlocking networks organized in multiple vertical 
arrangements. 
     The different specialized activities that have developed in these coalitions 
- economic , cultural or religious - have also often been combined with strong 
achievement orientations, but these have ultimately been oriented to broader con-
textual settings and were imbued with strong expressive dimensions and solidary 
components. 
     Closely related to the characteristics of these coalitions has been the rela-
tive weakness within each such setting and in between different settings, of 
autonomous cultural elites. Many cultural actors - priests, monks, scholars, and 
the like, and in the modern age, specialists and scientists - have participated in 
such coalitions. But with very few exceptions their participation has been de-
fined in primordial sacral-liturgical or natural terms; in terms of achievement set 
within such settings and of the social obligations according to which these coali-
tions have been structured. Only secondarily has such participation been struc-
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tured according to any distinct, autonomous criteria rooted in or related to "func-
tional needs" or to distinct definitions of the arenas of cultural specialization in 
which they were active. Or, in other words, while many special social spaces 
and frameworks in which the specialized cultural activities have been undertaken 
have been continuously constituted and reconstructed, the overall cultural arenas 
have not been defined as distinct ones, autonomous from the broader social 
sectors. 
     Accordingly, the cultural religious and intellectual elites, while often 
engaged in very sophisticated cultural activities and discourse, have evinced little 
autonomy in the social and political realm, i.e., as actors upholding values and 
orientations not embedded in existing social frameworks, but enunciated and 
articulated by them, and according to which they would be recruited. 
     Yet at the same time the great openness of many such coalitions to new 
members, as well as their capacity to shift between different contexts, also 
explains the possibility of the creation of new spaces and of the ability for many 
people to move between the different spaces - so long as the activities under-
taken in these spaces do not directly impinge on the centers of the respective 
coalitions or enter into a confrontational stance with them. 
     It is this embedment of the various specialized and above all of the cultural 
elites in broader social settings, defined in primordial, sacral and often hierarchic-
al terms, that has made it very difficult, as can be seen in the mode of "Japaniza-
tion" of Confucianism and Buddhism, as well as of Western influences analyzed 
above, for universalistic criteria based on a transcendental vision, stressing the 
existence of a chasm between the transcendental and mundane orders, or on func-
tional specialization, to become predominant in the major arenas of action. Such 
orientations and criteria have tended to become subsumed under the various con-
textual ones. 
     This embedment of the cultural elites in prevalent social settings or con-
texts, their ensuing self-referentiality, to use Murakami's expression - her-
meneutical reflexivity - has made it also, as can be seen in the numerous discus-
sions of various rebellions in the last years of the Tokugawa regime which led to 
the Meiji restoration, difficult for them to become connected with other rebel-
lious groups, or with various national or religious elites. The absence or weak-
ness of such actors could be seen in the process of the Meiji Restoration, where 
no such groups - in comparison with the European, Russian, and Chinese re-
volutions - have played an independent, formative role. But at the same time it 
is those coalitions of elites - especially the willingness of elites and influentials to 
incorporate new actors within the existing coalitions and networks, and the paral-
lel continual development of new spaces - that have facilitated the construction 
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and extension of generalized yet particularistic trust.
                      IX 
     It is such extension of the range of particularistic trust and the grounding 
of such extension in the combination of the modes of regulation and control and 
modes of interaction and exchange analyzed above and represented in continuous 
kinship-family symbolism, with its strong maternal components, and in her-
meneutical reflexivity, that provide the crucial key for understanding the dyna-
mics of social interaction in Japanese society. It is this activation of such exten-
sion of trust that explains the relative success of the channelling of the strong and 
active predispositions to change that have developed in Japanese society in the 
"contextual" direction
, i.e., the specific patterns of change and continuity that 
have developed in Japan and which we have analyzed above. 
     But such reproduction and the success of these modes of regulation of the 
various protests, of changes under the impact of endogenous and exogenous 
forces in these directions has not been given naturally - is indeed never given 
naturally. It has been contingent on the continual interaction between elites, 
influentials and broader sectors of society according to the specific modes of ex-
change and of regulation analyzed above. 
     Such linkages of trust may indeed break down. When these patterns of 
control and interaction have broken down - as was the case in many situations 
of crisis (as for instance during the students' outbreaks in the sixties or in some of 
the cases of status conflict analyzed by Susan Pharr, or in cases of mental break-
down or intensive conflict) - an unregulated anomic situation, often with great 
potentialities for aggression, has arisen. In other cases the breakdown of the abil-
ity to move between different contexts and to construct new contexts may give 
rise to the dissolution of groups or organizations. 20 
     Significantly, such breakdown is usually connected with the quest to rees-
tablish such linkages, even if in a new form, which may or may not be reestab-
lished. When reestablished, whether through old or new networks - although 
quite often such linkages may not be reestablished - it is the extensions of trust 
and solidarity and their symbols that are crucial in them. But the success of such 
reestablishment of linkages is not automatic or continuously reflexive; it may 
break down. It may especially break down when the overall environment in 
which any concrete institutional patterns which had crystallized at a certain 
moment changes drastically. The possibility of such breakdown in such situa-
tions may be also intensified because of the seeming lack of access to symbolic 
resources beyond the given social nexus, beyond the particularistic - even 
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if generalized - trust. This is probably one of the most important challenges 
facing contemporary Japan.
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